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“We’re a family. You owe us,” said thirty-eight year old African American mother Jo
Ann Talley, facing a panel of nine school board members intent upon closing down her alma
mater Riverside High School, located in downtown Chattanooga, Tennessee.1 As she challenged
the board with this statement at a public forum on June 21, 1983, nearly one hundred other
African American community members stood behind her, also armed with impassioned pleas for
the survival of the school which had served themselves, their children, or both for over two
decades. “Why do you always have to take the black people from their foundation?” cried
Charlotte Harris, another Riverside alumni. Francine Ricks, a student at the predominantly black
high school then, explained, “I’m a poor child. Rich students can afford to go to private
schools…I would like to graduate at Riverside High. All we’re asking for is a chance.” “This is a
black and white issue,” added 1967 graduate Peggy Mack, eliciting a murmur of agreement from
the crowd. Holding a poster drawing of an open grave, W.C. Tate summarized the prevailing
sentiment in the room with the simple statement, “You’ve buried us.”2 After fervently making
their case before the all-white board, protestors broke into the Riverside fight song in a final,
emotional effort to sway these men away from closing their beloved school. One week later, on
June 29, the board voted 7-2 in favor of shutting down Riverside High, issuing a public statement
that they did not want to “prolong the agony” of the Riverside family. As consolation for the
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Mark Kennedy, “Riverside Backers Make Fervent Pleas for School’s Future,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press,
June 22, 1983, Newspaper clipping in University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B.
Witt Chattanooga Public School Desegregation Records, Box 14, Folder 12.
2 J.B. Collins, “City School Board Hears Pleas For Riverside,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press, June 23, 1983,
Newspaper clipping in University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga
Public Schools Desegregation Records, Box 14, Folder 12.
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African American community’s loss, the school board suggested opening, “a depository to
display school athletic trophies.”3
The origins of the issues which plagued Riverside High School and eventually led to its
1983 closing can be traced back to the school’s founding exactly twenty years earlier. Prior to
the mid-1960s, the high school building located on East 3rd Street, near the downtown district of
Chattanooga, was known as Chattanooga High or City High and housed a predominantly white
student body. In 1963, amidst the numerous changes wrought by the Chattanooga school board’s
plan for desegregation, Chattanooga High was relocated across the Tennessee River stationed
among the burgeoning northern suburbs, and renamed City High.4 In turn, the East 3rd building
was renamed Riverside High School and served an all-black student population from the first day
its doors opened in September 1963.
Image 1.1
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Mark Kennedy, “School Board Votes to Close Riverside,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press, June 30, 1983,
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The troubling racial dynamics of this reconfiguration—the opening of a brand new facility in the
white, middle-class suburbs and the designation of a hand-me-down building as an all-black
school—would later prompt NAACP attorney Avon Williams to state in federal court, “So what
[the school board] did was to change this Chattanooga High School to the black high school and
move the white children into the new white high school out in the suburbs, didn’t [they]?”5
While Williams’s statement had merit, it underestimated the amount of loyalty and devotion the
Riverside student body held for their school. As student Otis McGhee claimed when protesting
the school’s closure in 1983, the first few graduating classes “took a run-down school and made
something of it.”6 However, twenty years after the school’s opening, statements such as these
could not disguise the fact that Riverside stood in bad condition. In the 1962-1963 school year,
enrollment was down by 52 percent from ten years prior, 17 percent of the senior class failed to
receive a diploma, and only 24 courses were offered to students, compared to the 55-70 offered
at other Chattanooga high schools.7 Rather than provide funding or take measures to stabilize
Riverside, the school board firmly pursued their goal of total closure, inciting an emotional and
ultimately fruitless community protest effort. Upon the school’s disintegration in the fall of 1983,
the Chattanooga board of education rezoned the majority of Riverside’s students to Howard
High, another all-black school. Superintendent James McCullough assured the local newspaper,
“It’s legal.”8

5

“Official Transcript of Proceedings in Civil Action No. 3564, May 10, 1971,” University of Tennessee at
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In many ways, the Riverside story was defined by dubitable actions on behalf of the
school board—the “handing down” of an older facility to an all-black student population, the
systematic neglect of the school for over ten years, the refusal to bus in other students to save the
school or consider closing another predominantly white school with low enrollment, etc.
However, Riverside’s problems with low enrollment and neglected facilities were not unique to
Chattanooga public schools throughout the 1980s. In 1989, the enrollment at Howard High
School, another all-black Chattanooga secondary school, was down 51 percent from ten years
prior.9 Patterns of drastically decreased enrollment evidenced themselves within all majority
black schools—elementary, middle, and high. For the school system as a whole, student
enrollment stood at 11,704 by the 1989 school year, nearly one third of the 27,480 which had
enrolled in 1966.10 Drastic demographic changes accompanied these startling figures. Between
1966 and 1989, the student body of the Chattanooga school system dropped from 46.5 percent
black and 53.5 percent white to 78 percent black and 22 percent white.11 More than two decades
after the onset of desegregation in Chattanooga, the disparity in racial balance within schools had
only increased.
In order to fully understand Chattanooga’s school system as it stood in the late 1980s, one
must trace the complex history of the desegregation process back to its legal enactment—the
landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court case—and follow its
implementation in Chattanooga schools through twenty-six years of litigation. During the year
following the Brown v. Board mandate, Chattanooga’s school board issued an official statement
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The two other majority black high schools in Chattanooga, Kirkman Technical School and Tyner High School,
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of compliance to the community, one that ultimately veiled a lack of concrete action. In 1960,
local African American citizen and NAACP member James Mapp sued the Chattanooga Board
of Education for their failure to actualize the Supreme Court order in a case that lasted over two
decades due to exhaustive appeals from both sides. The actual implementation of desegregation
in schools began in 1962, when sixteen elementary schools were integrated as part of a gradual
desegregation plan approved by federal judge Frank Wilson, who presided over the Mapp v.
Board case. This measured, grade-by-grade approach was disrupted in 1967, when Wilson
ordered that federal funding for Chattanooga’s public schools should be contingent upon their
full and immediate desegregation. Two years later, Mapp filed a motion for further relief,
bringing the issue of integration back into the courtroom. This time, the Chattanooga school
board was forced to submit an entirely new plan for desegregation, one of which included the
controversial practice of busing students to achieve a racial balance. Over the next fifteen years,
Mapp and the school board met in court intermittently, with Mapp’s representation continuously
insisting that the school board failed to produce integrated schools and the school board
maintaining that de facto segregation lay outside their control. In 1986, the case was officially
dismissed from the judicial system when the Supreme Court declined to hear it, thus upholding
the rulings of lower courts. For the first time in twenty-six years, James Mapp and his attorney
Avon Williams had no recourse to take, and Chattanooga schools fell from wary federal eyes.
The complex history of desegregation in Chattanooga can best be examined in two major
time periods, the first of which spans from the 1955 Brown v. Board decision to 1971, when the
Chattanooga school board was forced to accept a desegregation plan that included busing. This
section will focus predominantly on the school board’s lack of action between 1955 and 1960,
the subsequent demand for action from the black community in the form of the Mapp legal case,
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and the slow nature of change during the first decade of implemented desegregation. This lack of
change ultimately culminated in some of the most visible protest movements of the Chattanooga
desegregation era, as the black and white students of Brainerd High School clashed at two points
during the 1969-1970 school year. The second portion of this paper will cover the time between
the 1971 busing decision and the final dismissal of the Mapp case in 1986. During this era, the
fight for and against desegregation evolved, as the white middle class of Chattanooga showed
their distaste for integration by turning to legal resistance and “white flight” to county schools
and private institutions as opposed to the more visible protest or resistance in previous decades.
The potency and power of residential segregation also became a crucial factor during this time,
as the Chattanooga school board continued to argue in court that segregated residential patterns
lay outside their control. Ultimately, this argument was effective in court, as the case was
dismissed in 1986 on grounds that the school board had done all within their power to eliminate
segregation in schools. Although the story of desegregation in Chattanooga never featured the
massive white resistance and protest that marked and dramatized desegregation efforts in many
other American cities throughout the 1960s and 1970s, I argue that the confluence of entrenched
residential segregation, ample opportunity for “white flight” to private schools, and white,
middle-class legal resistance enabled the school board to maintain de facto segregation in
schools throughout the nationwide desegregation crisis.
Struggle in the Hallways: 1955-1971
The initial wave of public school integration that swept the nation throughout the late
1950s and 1960s were largely characterized by a tentative and gradual approach to racial equality
in schools, expressed through “freedom of choice” plans and thwarted by growing residential
segregation. In 1954, when the original Brown v. Board Supreme Court ruling was made, the
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majority of white Americans were far more concerned with the struggle for democracy being
acted out on the international stage than they were with ensuring all children received an equal
education at home. Additionally, the original 1954 desegregation ruling provided no mechanism
for its own implementation. The Supreme Court addressed this issue the following year by
inserting the “with all deliberate speed” clause, which allowed individual school boards the
freedom to enact desegregation policies at the rate and scope they saw fit. Such a phrase—“with
all deliberate speed”—proved to be frustratingly vague, as it provided no concrete parameters on
the timing or method of implementation and ultimately allowed pro-segregationists time to
organize.12 As a result of this, most cities, including Chattanooga, delayed action for as long as
possible, often until a legal case propelled them into court. The court orders that arose from this
first round of litigation were typically “freedom of choice” plans, wherein the school board
would disavow a dual system of black and white schools and thus “open up” schools to children
of both races, allowing them to select where they attended. Chattanooga adopted such a plan in
1962; however, like in most other cities, this practice produced little integration, as few black
students elected to transfer to white schools and nearly zero white students chose to attend black
schools.
Historians have examined the “freedom of choice” plans which emerged during the first
phase of desegregation, roughly 1955-1965. Scholar Jeffrey Raffel explains, “Freedom-of-choice
plans provided minority students with the formal right to select a school other than their formerly
assigned ‘black’ school.”13 These plans were founded upon the idea that segregated schools
existed when a minority student’s race prevented him or her from attending a certain school.
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Subsequent logic indicated that allowing a minority student to “choose” to attend a majority
white school would remedy this problem and ensure compliance with Brown v. Board. However,
as historian Charles Bolton argues in his study of desegregation in Mississippi, “Given the
history of segregated education, a desegregation mechanism such as freedom of choice…had
little chance of being implemented fairly. Freedom of choice school desegregation saddled
blacks with the burden of having to choose affirmatively to topple a segregated educational
structure dearly supported by whites.”14 “Affirmative” is a key word here, as its meaning within
the context of desegregation would later shift. Whereas freedom of choice plans placed an
affirmative responsibility upon black students to overcome the racism awaiting them at all-white
schools, later desegregation plans would confer an affirmative responsibility to school boards
and school officials—the responsibility to ensure that black students were truly assimilated into
the schools available to them.
Freedom of choice plans were also problematic in that they highlighted the stark
segregated residential patterns which strengthened throughout the 1950s and 1960s due to
discriminatory practices in the housing market and the growing displacement of African
Americans brought about by urban revitalization projects. The single system of school zones that
was applied to all portions of the city—zones that could be easily circumvented through freedom
of choice—coincided with neighborhood demographics in a way that precluded actual
integration. White children still attended the white schools in their zones, and black children still
attended the black schools in their respective zones. This phenomenon held true almost without
exception in Chattanooga during the early years of desegregation, as a review of the city’s spatial
and residential history will demonstrate. The segregation that this perpetuated in Chattanooga
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produced a great deal of outrage. Unlike many other cities, whose most volatile protest
movements arose during the 1970s with busing mandates, Chattanooga citizens displayed the
majority of visible discontent during the first phase of desegregation.
The Era of Inaction: Between Brown and Mapp
Opposition to integration arose early in Chattanooga, with many public officials initially
protesting the Supreme Court order to desegregate public schools, a mandate finalized by the
conclusion of the Brown v. Board case on May 17, 1954. In the days following the verdict, the
front page of Chattanooga’s daily newspaper, The Chattanooga Times, was repeatedly
emblazoned with Associated Press headlines and articles declaring the unprecedented, antisegregationist decision, while the editorial section within revealed local responses. In one 1954
article, entitled “Negro Opportunities Won’t Change in City,” reporter J.B. Collins discussed the
reactions to the rulings expressed by white male community leaders. Frank Trotter, then the
Commissioner of Education for Chattanooga, stated that he “[did] not believe that the
elimination of segregation in city schools [would] increase the educational opportunities of the
Negro pupils here.”15 Other prominent figures, such as chairman of the county school board,
echoed Trotter’s sentiment, arguing that there was no need for a change in the situation in
Chattanooga until “the Supreme Court [handed] down its specific decree on what southern
school systems [could] and [couldn’t] do.”16 Articles such as these also asserted that white and
black schools in Chattanooga already had equal facilities, equal pay for teachers, and equal
monetary allotment for students, demonstrating the blindness and indifference of public officials
to the very need for a decision such as Brown v. Board. Public representatives such as Trotter

15
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and Wallace, men who would later be instrumental in forming desegregation policy, felt from the
outset that segregation was an acceptable or even preferred state for Chattanooga’s schools.
Despite this evidence of early resistance to the desegregation mandate, the Chattanooga
school board made a showing of support for the integration of schools in the year following
Brown v. Board by announcing an intention to comply with the federal verdict. However, in
actuality, these efforts disguised a lack of real action, as no concrete developments happened in
the schools themselves until nearly a decade afterwards. In August 1955, the school board
released an official statement that opened with, “The Chattanooga Board of Education will
comply with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on the matter of integration in the
public schools.”17 This document suggested that the school board would “counsel with the
people of our community, seeking their advice and opinions in an atmosphere of earnest and
calm deliberation, hoping that as each decision is made, and as each step is taken, the community
will accept our decisions.”18 Despite the pervasiveness of conciliatory language, the document
also made it clear that no progress would be made hastily: “The Supreme Court decision does not
require immediate and complete integration. Your School Board does not contemplate any
immediate change in the operation of our schools.”19 Here, the school board relied heavily upon
the “with all deliberate speed” clause of the 1955 Brown v. Board decision. By emphasizing that
the Supreme Court had “wisely” entrusted them with the responsibility of “examin[ing]
individual local situation before making any final decisions,” they carefully reserved for
themselves the authority to implement desegregation according to their preferences, rather than
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those of the community or even the federal government.20 This authoritative language would
fade from the school board’s arsenal of propaganda over the course of the 1960s, as the federal
judiciary increasingly asserted their right to determine the course of desegregation.
One of the most revealing examples of the gap between school board promises and
concrete change throughout the 1950s can be seen in the dismantling of an “Interracial Advisory
Committee”—a body composed of black and white community members intended to shape
Chattanooga’s desegregation policy in the aftermath of Brown v. Board.21 While the idea of both
races united to determine the direction of integration sounded like a noble concept, the
demographic composition of the committee and its almost immediate dissolution in the face of
community protest reveal the inefficacy of the group. First, the racial makeup of this body was
highly skewed, with twenty-seven of the thirty-nine members being white.22 Although African
Americans were represented in the committee, the interests of the white community dominated
the committee’s agenda. Furthermore, a 1955 letter from Sue W. Albright, one of the original
members of the IAC, to the Chattanooga superintendent reveals that angry white prosegregationists protested meetings of this committee, hindering any progress the group might
have made. In this letter, Albright advised that Mr. Witt, “in announcing future meetings will
emphatically state that police will clear the room of all but the press in the event of disorderly
demonstration.”23 Albright’s account, coupled with the sudden disappearance of any of trace of
the Interracial Advisory Committee after 1955, suggests that this initial effort made by the
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Chattanooga school board to enforce desegregation quickly disintegrated and affected no actual
change.
Aside from physical protests such as those conducted by white anti-integrationists at the
meetings of the Interracial Advisory Committee, black and white citizens of Chattanooga and
other regions of Tennessee expressed frustration with their school board through petitions and
letters throughout the latter half of the 1950s. Although written by groups with competing
agendas, these letters similarly challenged the board’s claim that the community was progressing
towards successful desegregation. In 1958, an African American organization called the Citizens
for General Improvement (CGI) submitted a newsletter to the Chattanooga Board of Education
in hopes of “improving the economic, social, and political conditions of all citizens in this
community.”24 The CGI’s principle purpose in publishing this newsletter was to bring attention
to the unfavorable conditions and overcrowding in three predominantly black schools—Calvin
Donaldson, Orchard Knob, and Chattanooga Avenue. By directly accusing the local school board
of not taking “one step in that direction [towards integration],” they refuted many white
Chattanooga citizens’ argument that African Americans did not actually desire integration.25
Another 1958 letter, this one authored by an organization of white southerners called the
Tennessee Society to Maintain Segregation, expressed a similar frustration with the Chattanooga
school board, albeit for the opposite reason—the board’s statement of compliance with the
Supreme Court mandate.26 This group, self-described as “a civic organization representing at this

“Citizens for General Improvement Newsletter, October 11, 1958,” From University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records,
http://cdm16877.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16877coll8/id/ 2045 (Accessed February 28, 2016).
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time over 25,000 citizens who are taxpayers and are vitally interested in their public schools,”
framed their petition as a questionnaire for the school board, with questions ranging from simple
personal inquiries to pointedly racist questions such as, “Do you take pride in being a member of
the white race?”27 Because Tennessee and other states on the fringes of the Deep South fostered
a climate of comparative racial moderation, extremist groups such as this did not garner the same
enthusiasm there as elsewhere. Organized racism in the Upper South simply struggled to find
proponents.28 Therefore, it comes as little surprise that the Tennessee Society to Maintain
Segregation’s correspondence elicited no apparent reaction from the Chattanooga school board.
However, its existence within the body of evidence from this era in Chattanooga’s desegregation
process indicates that the school board’s statement of compliance with Brown v. Board
motivated local and regional white citizens alike to demand a retraction.
“Freedom of Choice”: Mapp v. Board and Residential Segregation in Chattanooga
The demands for action from Chattanooga’s white and black communities was finally
met in 1960, when NAACP member James Mapp sued the Chattanooga Board of Education for
failing to actualize school desegregation in a case that would last over two decades. Mapp, the
father of four children in the Chattanooga public school system, took issue with the fact that his
son and three daughters were denied the ability to enroll in the school closest and therefore most
convenient for them. Using his legal connections with the NAACP, he brought a case against the
Chattanooga Board of Education with the help of Avon Williams, a Nashville attorney who
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would come to be known for his relentlessness in the court room and determination to appeal.29
For the other defendants, local attorney and school board member Raymond Witt volunteered his
services as legal counsel. Witt would eventually step down from his position on the school board
to concentrate on his legal work, and both he and Williams remained the primary counsel for the
defendants and plaintiffs respectively until the 1986 dismissal. The first phase of this case was
tried in district court under Judge Frank Wilson on July 20, 1960, and on this day, the courts
ruled that Chattanooga’s existing school system was unconstitutional and that a plan for
desegregation must be submitted to the district court before December of that year.30 According
to this “freedom of choice” plan, which cycled through two amendments before approval by the
courts, the first through third grades of Chattanooga’s elementary schools would be desegregated
in the 1962-1963 school year by the application of “a single system of zones,” with subsequent
grades integrated in the following years. Chattanooga parents could elect whether to send their
child to their neighborhood school or elsewhere, but in order to attend outside the prescribed
zone, they would have to fill out a transfer application.31 In July of 1961, this method was
accepted by the district court as adequate progress towards full desegregation.
In order to further understand the minimal effect that this first “freedom of choice”
desegregation plan had on public schools in practice, one must first review the history of
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residential patterns in Chattanooga. From the initial phases of the Mapp v. Board case until the
very end of the case in 1986, racially inequitable zoning policies and housing practices contained
African Americans within certain neighborhoods and played arguably the most crucial role in
frustrating desegregation efforts. Although the prevalence of housing segregation did not surface
as an argument in court until the 1970s, its insidious effects could be seen as early as 1962 and
should therefore be discussed from the outset. Understanding how neighborhoods were carefully
structured and maintained by municipal and private organizations of Chattanooga lends
explanation to the inefficacy of a single system of zones and a “freedom of choice” plan. Simply
put, white children remained in white schools because they lived in white neighborhoods, and the
inverse held true for black children in the fulfillment of a narrative that originated over a century
before.32
The development of Chattanooga’s urban landscape began in the mid-nineteenth century,
as the region developed into an industrial city due to its strategic location on the Tennessee River
at the gateway between Lookout and Signal Mountains. Incorporated in 1839, it rapidly
expanded into the leading commercial center of the area, bolstered by accessibility to water
transportation and ample railways.33 As the epicenter of industrial development, the downtown
area of Chattanooga attracted many heavy industry workers and their families, and these lowincome employees, many of them black, settled in close proximity to their jobs. As a result of the
growing industrialization and subsequent pollution of the downtown area, white families who
could afford to do so began their exodus to the wealthy neighborhoods of Signal and Lookout
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Mountains, as well as growing suburban areas on the city’s outskirts. The African American
residents of the industrial center were left to occupy what little dilapidated, low-income housing
was present. However, during the post-World War II economic boom, white city officials
decided that in order to reclaim downtown, they would institute a number of federally-subsidized
urban “revitalization” programs—a common phenomenon throughout the nation in the 1950s. In
Chattanooga, this movement was known as the Golden Gateway Urban Renewal Project, and it
prophesied highway construction, improved residential areas, reduced pollution, and, most
threatening for black residents, the eradication of “blighted” or slum structures. In his book The
Origins of the Urban Crisis, historian Thomas Sugrue discusses a similar project that took place
in downtown Detroit during the 1950s and its adverse effects on the black population. As he
states, “The city’s redevelopment projects soon demonstrated the commonplace wisdom of the
streets that ‘slum removal equals Negro removal.’ The city had no adequate relocation plans for
residents uprooted by urban renewal.”34 As result of this disregard, black residents of Detroit had
two choices. They could choose to grapple for equality within the private housing market, where
racially restrictive neighborhood covenants and discriminatory practices in real estate frustrated
them at every turn. More commonly, however, impoverished African American citizens were
crammed into whatever little public housing remained, worsening decaying conditions there and
validating the city’s call for further ghetto removal.35
Chattanooga’s Golden Gateway project created a similar dilemma for black residents
living in downtown Chattanooga during the late 1950s and 1960s. As city planners and public
officials prepared for the construction of Interstate 24 and a fleet of new office buildings along
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Market and Broad Street, they devised a “rating system” that justified elimination much of the
public housing black workers relied on to house their families. Carried out by a municipal body
called the Better Housing Commission, a series of surveys rated each census tract in Chattanooga
based on condition of structures, homogeneity of land use, community service, streets, and
housing. The description of point distributions and deductions reveals the survey’s racist
undertones: “Areas which have seen a marked change from white to Negro occupancy in recent
years have been designated as transition areas…It should be noted that Negro occupancy, per se,
is not of course a depreciating factor. However, the process of transition at the present time
creates problems of friction and disrupts community ties.”36 Despite the claim that black
residency was punishable, “per se,” communities were awarded points for “not being a
transitional area” and “having few or no conversions to multi-family dwelling.”37 Sugrue also
points out how attacking these “multi-family dwellings” disproportionately targeted poor black
people of the city, as they commonly combined households with extended family members to
combat the public housing shortage.38 Over the course of nearly twenty years, the Golden
Gateway project resulted in the widespread and systematic relocation of black downtown
residents.
“Tyranny of the Courts”: Midcentury Anticommunist Resistance to Desegregation
Although the Mapp v. Board case provided the catalyst for integration in Chattanooga, it
failed to produce the immediate results hoped for by many African American citizens, largely
due to residential segregation, and ignited fierce resistance within the white community, further
demonstrating the enduring dissatisfaction that pervaded Chattanooga’s method of
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desegregation. White citizens of Chattanooga such as Dr. T.H. Patton and Kate Steele felt that
the courts were overstepping their boundaries in any efforts to enforce desegregation. In letters to
the Board of Education, Dr. Patton and Mrs. Steele relied extensively on mid-twentieth century
anticommunist rhetoric to protest against mandatory integration. In order to understand the
mentality which fueled letters such as those of Patton and Steele, one must first grasp the
profound connection between the civil rights movement and the international struggle for
democracy at the mid-twentieth century, as well as the ways in which southern white
supremacists often appropriated anticommunist rhetoric for their own pro-segregationist agenda.
In her book Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, historian Mary
Dudziak contends that, during the Cold War era, the world perceived the institution of Jim Crow
segregation in the army and public schools as antithetic to the democratic system America sought
to spread. In order to rectify this damaging international image, the American government passed
a number of civil rights reform legislature in the 1950s under President Truman, with the Brown
vs. Board Supreme Court decision acting as one of the most crucial of these. As Dudziak states,
“The Truman administration stressed to the Supreme Court the international implications of race
discrimination and focused on the negative impact on U.S. foreign relations that a pro
segregation decision [in Brown v. Board] might have.”39 In a time when newspapers nationwide
were plastered with headlines about the activities of the “Reds” on a daily basis, the American
public felt the pressure to adopt any measure that might combat the seemingly overwhelming
force of Communism.
While the United States government and a good portion of its citizenry certainly
understood the relationship between civil reform and international reputation, a small but
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influential faction of white southerners distorted this correlation, ironically using anticommunist
rhetoric to support the continuation of segregation in schools throughout the 1950s. Explaining
this unique phenomenon in his work Black Struggle, Red Scare, Jeff Woods maintains, “During
the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s…segregation and anti-Communism acted as the
mutually reinforcing components of an extreme southern nationalism.”40 This “extreme southern
nationalism” centered around a fervent desire to protect the conservative traditions of the
antebellum South, imagined as a golden era that had been stripped away by the federal
government. Components of this antebellum ideology included racially coded social
stratification, fundamentalist religious beliefs, and the predominance of regional loyalty over
federal allegiance. White Southerners’ desire to preserve a time in which slavery was a crucial
component of the social structure, combined with a suspicion of the revolutionary potential of
African Americans that was rooted in past slave rebellions, produced a fierce resistance to the
end of Jim Crow laws. These southerners believed that, because former slaves had little
experience with democracy or capitalism, the black population would be more prone to a
communist worldview, automatically casting them as anti-American and anti-southern. However,
as Woods emphasizes, they also took issue with the United States government itself, maintaining
that the federal courts should not have jurisdiction over “southern ways”—a conflict dating back
to the pre-Civil War state’s rights crisis.41 Thus, in the minds of these white supremacists, the
power-greedy federal government and alleged anti-American, Communist black population
conspired to disrupt the social, political, and economic patterns of the South with legislation such
as Brown v. Board. Although this particular brand of anticommunism was never widely
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accepted, it garnered a great deal of popularity in the South—enough to make the delicate
process of desegregation even more difficult.
Close analysis of the letters from white citizens T.H. Patton and Kate Steele reveal the
ways in which this southern anticommunist rhetoric pervaded the desegregation process in
Chattanooga and hindered community leadership to implement a successful and accepted method
of school integration. Although some regional and demographic differences distinguished Patton
and Steele, with T.H. Patton being a male doctor from northern Tennessee and Kate Steele being
a housewife from Chattanooga, the similarities in the tone and content of their letters is striking.
Both, written to school board attorney Raymond B. Witt in the aftermath of the Mapp v. Board
verdict, refer to the Supreme Court as a puppet of Communism, with Steele writing, “We are
under the tyranny of courts the same as Russia is under the tyranny of the Communists.”42
Similarly, Dr. Patton advised the school board to, “Protect your city from dangerous Communist
Negro-mixing” and “the corrupt courts,” implying that African Americans were somehow
inherently Communist and threatening to American values.43 The analogous language of these
two letters ultimately upholds Woods’s premise that anticommunist rhetoric was a powerful if
not definitive aspect of white supremacism throughout the south. If two individuals separated by
region, gender, occupation, and social status used nearly identical terms to describe the
phenomenon of desegregation, they were both clearly informed by the same influential ideology.
While most Americans acknowledged the incompatibility of racial segregation and an
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international struggle for democracy, citizens such as Patton and Steele turned this argument on
its head—maintaining that integration would further the Communist cause.
Turmoil Beneath Tranquility: School Board Proceedings Throughout the 1960s
Although the immediate aftermath of the Mapp v. Board legal case foreshadowed the
problems that were to plague Chattanooga’s desegregation process throughout the next decade,
quantitative evidence from 1967 and 1968 demonstrates just how ineffective the school board
was in producing integrated schools. According to an official report issued by the board of
education on the state of public schools as of the 1966-1967 school year, only twenty six of the
forty four schools approved for desegregation actually had an integrated student population by
this time.44 The report also indicated that only 57.2 percent of the 27,163 students in the
Chattanooga public school system were enrolled in desegregated schools, and the majority of
children granted transfers were white.45 In an effort to remedy this lack of progress towards full
desegregation, the district court to which the Chattanooga school board was answerable ordered
that the immediate desegregation of the eighth through twelfth grades occur during the 19671968 school year, interrupting the grade-by-grade approach.46 This order marked a major turning
point for both the Chattanooga school system and community members grappling with the
integration process. As Raymond Witt observed in a letter to fellow attorney John Henniss,
“When junior high schools and high schools are desegregated, for a number of children this will
be their first desegregation experience…While there were a number of elementary schools that
were not affected by desegregation because of the geographical housing pattern, this will not be
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true in the junior high and high school groups.”47 Because elementary schools outnumbered
junior high and high schools in Chattanooga, their attendance zones were more compact,
meaning that many white and black children remained segregated in schools as a result of
racially segregated neighborhoods. Secondary education facilities were fewer in number;
therefore, the abolition of dual zones created zones with residential areas ranging from suburban
enclaves to inner city public housing. Witt prophesied in his letter to Henniss the opposition that
this would cultivate amongst white families who had previously avoided desegregation, using the
predominantly white St. Elmo neighborhood as an example: “The people of St. Elmo have
accepted the few negroes that have entered their elementary school with good graces…But St.
Elmo is entirely surrounded by negro population…As a result, Lookout Jr. High would
undoubtedly have a substantial negro population. The people in St. Elmo are extremely sensitive
because they have seen this all coming.”48 Unlike the relatively uneventful experience with
elementary school desegregation, the integration of middle and high schools would foster deep
division within the Chattanooga community.
The inadequacies of Chattanooga’s method of desegregation can best be seen in the racial
conflicts that plagued Brainerd High School throughout the 1969-1970 school year—conflicts
that ultimately highlighted the unwillingness of both black and white Chattanooga citizens to
accept desegregation as it stood fifteen years after Brown v. Board. In 1967, when immediate
desegregation was ordered, Brainerd High still had an all-white student body, and its symbols of
school pride—the Confederate flag, the “Rebel” mascot, and the “Dixie” anthem—highlighted a
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history of antebellum white supremacy.49 This dynamic created a hostile environment when
African American students enrolled for the first time in 1967, even though these tensions did not
erupt until two years later. On the night of October 3, 1969, the students of Brainerd filled the
campus stadium to watch their football team, the Rebels, square off against rivals in the hallmark
southern tradition of the Friday night homecoming game. Of the hundreds of students in
attendance, some thirty or forty African Americans represented the disproportionately small
black population attending Brainerd, shortly after halftime, this small faction of students rose
from their seats and moved down to the playing field, carrying with them a rolled Confederate
flag—a symbol that would have sparked southern pride and a sense of patriotism within the vast
majority of the game’s white attendees. Next, the African American students boldly stormed the
playing area and, in full vision of spectators, set fire to the school’s beloved symbol—a move
that incited angry white students, parents, and administrators to vacate their seats and flood the
field.50 As violence broke out between black and white, police backup was called and ordered to
remove all African Americans from the stadium. The headline of the Chattanooga Times the
following morning read, “Disorderly Negroes Mar Brainerd Game,” and the cover story featured
a photograph of an African American female student being pinned to the ground by the billy club
of a police officer.51
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While this homecoming game incident proved to be the spark that ignited racial conflict
at Brainerd, events over the next several weeks and months demonstrated that problems had
existed long before this time. On October 7, 1969, several days after the burning of the
Confederate flag, approximately one thousand of Brainerd’s twelve hundred white students
exited the building in protest of administrators’ intention to abolish the flag symbol and the
playing of the Dixie anthem.52 Over the next week, headlines spoke of rock-throwing and gunfire
between black and white youths, which culminated in the institution of a city-wide curfew.53
While the curfew succeeded in quelling outright confrontations, it did nothing to solve the deeper
racial conflicts at work, as evidenced by the resurgence of strife the following spring. April of
1970 was a particularly tumultuous time for Brainerd, as administrators were forced to close
down the school for two days following a series of violent exchanges between black and white
students.54 According to a report written and submitted by white Brainerd student David
Thompson to a disciplinary committee commissioned to investigate events at Brainerd, the April
controversy began when white and black students violently clashed in the hallways of the school:
“[White student] Harold Simpson was walking down the hall…when the accused [black] student
started chasing him. There were around 20 to 25 [black] students…These students then started to
throw chairs at the windows as they were running. The evidence is the broken windows and the
show case, the tables and chairs thrown through the halls.”55 The Chattanooga Times-Free Press
similarly reported the incident, stating, “The trouble apparently began Wednesday during the
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noon recess with a fight in a restroom in which two white youths…were beaten by an
undetermined number of Negro students.”56 On that day, all black students at Brainerd were
dismissed from school at midday, loaded onto school buses, and removed from the parking lot as
white students amassed in front of the campus and started chanting, “‘Blacks gotta go, hey!
Blacks gotta go!’”57
Although the ubiquity of white-authored evidence, such as the disciplinary report issued
by Thompson and the Chattanooga News-Free Press articles, make it difficult to piece together a
nonpartisan account of what happened at Brainerd during these few months of conflict, a series
of 1969 and 1970 newsletters entitled “The Black United Front” provides a starkly different
narrative. Narrowly circulated, “The Black United Front” was issued weekly by Black Knights,
Inc., a Chattanooga-based African American organization whose members aligned themselves
with the growing black power movement. As their mission statement read, “The United Front is
the official organ of Black Knights, Inc., with the purpose of bringing news pertinent to the black
community of Chattanooga…and to be used by the people of the community as a means of
bringing to the open the many problems plaguing them.”58 Throughout the fall of 1969 and
spring of 1970, much of the newsletter’s content focused on the happenings at Brainerd,
beginning with the protests against the Dixie anthem and Rebel flag. An anonymous “Black
Brainerd Student” wrote in October 1969, “The honkies, from the hard-core racist to the
perfume-sweet liberal, from Commissioner of Education….to the ‘Chattanooga Times,’ are
trying to justify to the old south slavery symbols cherished by the white students at Brainerd
“Brainerd High is Closed Today After More Strife Wednesday,” The Chattanooga News-Free Press, April 16,
1970, Newspaper clipping, Box 5, Folder 2, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records,
Special Collections, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Tennessee.
57
Sanders, “Ask Assistance in Restoring…”
58
“The Black United Front newsletter, vol. 1 no. 2,” December 25, 1969, Box 6, Folder 7, Special Collections,
Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga,
Tennessee.
56

Reed 27
High School…So the black students at Brainerd are saying, ‘Take that Rebel flag…and flush it
down the toilet where it belongs.’”59 The cover of another issue, this one published shortly after
the April 1970 closing of the school, depicted a hand drawn cartoon of a fleet of white-hooded
KKK members, labeled “The Brainerd Rebels.”60 The article underneath read, “There is an effort
to cool the disturbances and to re-open Brainerd High School by the powers that be… Racism,
nurtured from Mayor Drop-out Bender down to the redneck parents, is the real problem at
Brainerd…The white people involved, including [principal] Von Schaaf, the faculty, the
students, all must admit their racist tendencies before the Brainerd crisis can be smoothed out.”61
The openly oppositional tone of the Black United Front newsletters ultimately connected
events in Chattanooga public schools to the black power movements growing in universities and
other liberal spaces in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As black high school students at Brainerd
found themselves increasingly embroiled in bitter racial turmoil, black university students across
the nation were developing strategies to not only cope with, but also actively resist
discrimination. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, or SNCC, formed in 1960 as
one of the most crucial coalitions for young black activists. The SNCC promoted activism at a
community level, encouraging students to participate in sit-ins and other forms of nonviolent
protest. Their commitment to nonviolence began to waver in 1966, as the “black power”
principles of racial pride, self-determination for black individuals, and the creation of a black
identity took precedent over nonviolence.62 Another conduit for the spread of black power
thought was the Black Panther Party, who espoused the idea that black communities were
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“colonies within the mother country of Africa.”63 The Black Panther Party unapologetically
called for the black race’s emancipation from white social, political, and economic institutions.
Ralph Moore, the creator and editor of the United Front publication, associated himself with both
of these groups and bolstered black power ideology in Chattanooga in the late 1960s with the
formation of the Black Knights. Moore, a Chattanooga native and devout member of the Black
Panther Party, returned to his hometown in 1966 with a radicalized notion of racial equality and
black identity after attending the historically black Wilberforce College in Ohio and serving in
the Vietnam War.64 The Black Knights were born out of Moore’s vision and the influence of
other black activists in Chattanooga, many of whom associated themselves with SNCC.65
Therefore, the Black United Front newsletter in many ways abridged the distance between the
hallways of openly hostile schools such as Brainerd and the more liberalized spaces of college
campuses and black power meetings. Because Ralph Moore and others like him brought to
Chattanooga the ideology of SNCC and the Black Panthers, students such as the “Black Brainerd
Student” were able to draw upon the rhetoric of black power movements in protesting the events
happening at his or her own high school. In one image published in the Chattanooga News-Free
Press during its coverage of the spring 1970 conflict, black Brainerd students are seen holding up
one fist—an icon of the black power movement—as they awaited removal from the campus.66
Black students at Brainerd clearly did not exist within a vacuum of naiveté to the injustices
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served them; rather, they attempted to use the language and tactics of a much larger black
activism to improve their personal circumstances.
Following the reopening of Brainerd High School in May of 1970, general coverage of
the school faded from publication in the Chattanooga Times, indicating that administrators and
students reached no true accordance or reform. However, the incidents were enough to spark
renewed legal efforts from the James Mapp camp, who filed a motion for immediate relief in
later 1969. According to a Chattanooga Times article entitled “Court Requested to Ask for Plan
of Desegregation,” James Mapp and three additional plaintiffs “asked the U.S. District Court to
request the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to draft a plan ‘to achieve
immediately a unitary school system in the city of Chattanooga.’”67 The article also quotes Mapp
who claimed, “The school board is building schools and addition to schools in such a manner as
to conform to racial residential patterns…A freedom-of-choice desegregation plan employed by
defendants in the high schools has not resulted in elimination of segregation therein.”68 In many
ways, the complaints addressed by Mapp and his fellow plaintiffs—lack of school board action,
continued segregation, and inferior conditions in predominantly African American schools—
sound identical to the ones initially issued ten years prior. However, Mapp also introduced a new
type of language in this article, one whose key terms included “racial residential patterns” and
focused on the way housing was related to school zoning. Thus, on the cusp of the 1970s, the
Chattanooga community and school board faced an increasingly complex and difficult situation,
one affected by community resistance, federal supervision, and grassroots activism within the
schools themselves. Brainerd, and by extension the past ten years of desegregation, had proven

“Court Requested to Ask for Plan of Desegregation,” The Chattanooga News-Free Press, November 15, 1969,
Newspaper clipping, Box 4, Folder 7, Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools
Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Tennessee.
68
“Court Requested to Ask…”
67

Reed 30
not to be a transformative or redemptive occurrence, but merely the first phase in a desegregation
process that would only grow more complicated with time.
Struggle in the Courtroom: 1971-1986
Throughout the early 1970s, as the Mapp v. Board of Education case faced a resurgence
of litigation, the national climate surrounding desegregation and the civil rights movements
evolved in ways that would come to directly affect educational policies and legal procedures in
Chattanooga. Increasingly, school desegregation legal cases were ushered into higher courts,
where federal courts handed down opinions and orders which set precedents for other
communities throughout the nation. This decentralized approach to enforcement of the original
Brown vs. Board mandate raised an entirely new set of questions during the 1970s, one of the
most crucial of which was the extent of school boards’ responsibility in eliminating
desegregation. In most major metropolises, the “freedom of choice” plans enacted during the late
1950s and early 1960s, or during the initial phases of desegregation, resulted in schools that
remained stubbornly segregated due to structural racism that contained black citizens within
certain neighborhoods and school zones through housing discrimination, strategic construction of
public housing, and urban revitalization efforts. Therefore, the question posed to school systems
by federal courts evolved from, “What have you done to prevent segregation?” to “Have you
done enough?” This inquiry resounded through cities across the nation and generated
increasingly complex legal situations and community responses. Generally, federal judges
sympathized with the NAACP and the liberal desegregationists during these late 1960s and early
1970s trials, producing well-known verdicts such as those in Green v. County Board of New
Kent, Alexander v. Holmes, and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg.69 Most of these verdicts
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included provisions for busing, or the forced redistribution of students to achieve racial balance
in all schools, which created strong backlash from white parents.
As a consequence of the turmoil created by many of the early 1970s busing plans, the
latter half of the decade saw the reform or total removal of many previously instated
desegregation policies. In cities such as Detroit and Boston, busing caused such an uproar
amongst the white community that higher courts deemed it unworthy of the turmoil and frequent
violence it fostered. Decisions such as the 1974 Supreme Court ruling in Bradley v. Milliken,
wherein a busing plan that exchanged black kids from the urban center of Detroit with the white
kids from the suburbs was overturned, contributed to the growing tide of wariness towards
busing. Another frustration to the cause of desegregation was the massive “white flight” to
suburbia that had begun. White families who felt uneasy about the integration of schools left
urban centers in droves, settling amongst the growing suburbs with their private schools and
majority-white public schools. The result of these obstructions was a gradual decline of interest
in desegregation. The fervor with which federal courts had attacked the issue during the early
1970s faded into lassitude and a pervasive sense of defeat. By the middle of the 1980s, most
school systems were released from federal supervision and left to their own means, and as many
historians have argued, resegregation of schools began.70
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In Chattanooga specifically, segregation in many public schools was sustained
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s through a successful combination of legal resistance to
busing from white parents and claims on behalf of the school board that the massive white flight
that occurred after 1972 could not be prevented. Essentially, the school board stalled concrete
progress towards full desegregation in schools throughout the 1970s by claiming they needed an
appeal ruling, funding for buses, or the return of white students before “real change” could take
place. In the meantime, the lack of any visible, volatile protest from the community, black or
white, enabled the school system to fly under the radar, while other regional centers, such as
Nashville, attracted a great deal of attention due to the more violent nature of desegregation
there.71 The stalling tactics employed by Chattanooga officials ultimately allowed the school
board to keep many schools in a segregated state until the late 1970s and 1980s, when many
courts dismissed desegregation cases out of exhaustion with the entire affair. Chattanooga was
no exception. In 1986, the Mapp v. Board case was dismissed on the grounds that schools had
stood in compliance with their federal court order since 1974. In reality, however, the Board of
Education still operated a number of facilities, such as Howard High and Tyner High, that were
either all-black or all-white. To the present day, Chattanooga public schools reflect the legacy of
desegregation (and resegregation) in the city.
“The Agony of May”: The 1971 Trial and Evolving Definitions of Responsibility
“I apologize for not getting back to you sooner,” wrote Raymond Witt in a letter to the
city attorney Eugene Collins in July of 1971, “After the agony of May with the trial and
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everything else going to hell, I decided to take some time off.”72 Witt’s “agony” refers to his
experience at the 1971 courtroom hearing of Mapp v. Board of Education of Chattanooga, which
came about as the eventual consummation of the motion for immediate relief filed by James
Mapp and his NAACP attorney Avon Williams in the fall of 1969 after the Brainerd controversy.
In this motion, Mapp and Williams had accused the Chattanooga school board of perpetuating
segregation in schools through reliance on residential segregation. The May 1971 evidentiary
hearing that resulted was arguably the most significant courtroom experience of the twenty-sixyear case, and it was certainly the most extensive and exhausting for the plaintiffs and defendants
alike. For seven days between May 9th and 19th, Witt, Mapp, Williams, and their many respective
witnesses rotated in and out of Judge Frank Wilson’s courtroom, producing hundreds of pages of
transcribed briefs, questionings, and cross-examinations. This meticulous and laborious approach
was largely due to the aforementioned national reframing of questions surrounding
desegregation. Judge Wilson did not have to decide whether or not the Chattanooga school board
had acted in regards to desegregation, for Wilson himself had originally approved their gradual,
“freedom of choice” formula. Instead, he had to determine whether or not these actions had
accomplished enough to eliminate desegregation “root and branch,” as the Supreme Court
opinion in Green v. County Board of New Kent now required.73 Whereas previous hearings of the
Mapp v. Board case focused on the school board taking action to open schools up to students of
both races, this one questioned the structural racism and insidious sociopolitical forces that
consistently rendered those actions ineffective, as well as what could be done to finally
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overcome them. Ultimately, the 1971 trial ushered in a new era of desegregation in Chattanooga,
as Judge Wilson followed the precedent set by Judge McMillan in the Swann v. Charlotte case
and found the school board responsible for lingering segregation in schools.
The transcriptions produced by this exhaustive, week-long evidentiary hearing reveal that
the issue of residential segregation in Chattanooga was the crux of Wilson’s decision. Although
discriminatory practices in housing and the ever-widening disparity between black and white
neighborhood was nothing new for the city, this was the first time it could be used as legitimate
evidence in court. NAACP attorney Avon Williams capitalized upon this day after day, offering
concrete proof that school zones and housing sectors corresponded according to race in
Chattanooga. Robert Taylor, a city planner brought in to witness that the school board had not
acted with any intent of discrimination in establishing zones, repeatedly found himself on the
receiving end of Williams’ dogged questioning. On the second day of trial, Williams
demonstrated that, during the 1962-1963 school year, three hundred white children were bused
out of Clara Carpenter, a neighborhood school whose closure was part of the original
desegregation plan, and sent past two all-black schools to another all-white school, Glenwood
Elementary. In no other situation did the school system use buses during those early years.74
During the same day of cross-examining Robert Taylor, Williams used maps to show that, when
housing projects were built during the urban redevelopment plans of the 1950s and 1960s, they
were either constructed near and zoned for already black schools, or schools were built adjacent
to them shortly afterwards. One example he emphasized involved Piney Woods elementary,
which opened as an “integrated school” during the 1964-1965 school year. In what Taylor
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labeled a “coincidence,” it lay across the street from the Emma Wheeler Housing Project in the
southwestern quadrant of the city. Because the Emma Wheeler homes contained 338 black
residents and only 2 white ones, Piney Woods’s student body was all-black from its opening.75
The Riverside and City High exchange discussed previously revealed the opposite phenomenon,
wherein new facilities were built in the northern suburbs to shelter its white, middle-class
families from the effects of desegregation. In response to these inquiries, Robert Taylor typically
answered with some variation of, “The primary criteria [of the school board] was for the
convenience of the youngsters.”76 Responses such as this failed to dismantle even a brick of
Williams’s wall of concrete evidence. In an editorial published in the Chattanooga Times-Free
Press, courtroom onlooker Franklin McCallie observed, “[Williams] had them. They didn’t stand
a chance.”77
Judge Wilson confirmed McCallie’s observation with his May 19, 1971 opinion, which
supported Mapp’s motion for immediate relief by requiring the Chattanooga school board to
submit an entirely new plan for desegregation—one which would acknowledge and remedy past
discriminatory actions and abolish the ahistorical mindset behind “freedom of choice” plans.
This opinion opened with the straightforward admission, “It appears, as admitted here in the
record by every witness…save the attorney for the defense himself, that the Chattanooga School
System is not in compliance with the law.”78 After reviewing the desegregation cases which had
gained national attention over the previous years, Wilson went on to state, “Certainly there are
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attractive features to the matter of freedom of choice in this area… Unfortunately, freedom of
choice simply has not worked in the Chattanooga School System. You have to look no farther
than the school administrations’ own statistics to demonstrate that fact.”79 Although Wilson’s
opinion reads more like a placid acknowledgement of blatant inequality than an indignant
condemnation of discriminatory practices, he nevertheless made good on his opinion one week
later, when he ordered that a new desegregation plan be submitted by June 18, 1971 for approval
and implementation by the start of the 1971-1972 school year.80 Almost immediately after the
case was concluded, James Mapp and Avon Williams notified the school board of their intent to
appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, Ohio.
The desegregation plan submitted by the Chattanooga school board, which underwent an
amendment process before official approval by Judge Wilson on August 5, 1971, ultimately
proved to be little more than another stalling tactic, as it used financial justification to avoid any
extensive busing and included minimal changes in high school zoning. The opening page of the
document reads, “In a confused and ambiguous area the Board has done the best it can under
these circumstances, remembering that the maintenance of the educational opportunity for the
25,000 children of Chattanooga is its paramount responsibility.”81 This statement was nothing
new. In countless statements and proposals, the school board commonly used language that
suggested desegregation would somehow compromise the holistic integrity of education, in
defending its actions, or lack thereof. However, they were not wrong in accusing the courts of
ambiguity. Although Judge Wilson had clearly found that the school board was responsible for
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eliminating all vestiges of segregation, past and present, he never provided specificities on how
this should be accomplished. Nowhere in his order did he explicitly mention busing. Therefore,
the school board easily avoided the issue by claiming that buses were not a feasible part of the
budget at that time: “Recognizing that transportation service could become an expensive item for
the school system, an expenditure heretofore not projected as a part of the operate
budget…Within the present school budget necessary financial support for transportation is not
possible.”82 This proved an effective evasive maneuver, for even though the new desegregation
plan was technically implemented in the fall of 1971, the lack of buses made any drastic zoning
changes impossible.
Chattanooga’s “Silent Majority”: Resistance to Busing in Regional and National Context
Although the Chattanooga school board’s 1971 amended plan for desegregation appeared
mild and provided few substantive changes compared to the drastic busing schemes that
upheaved cities such as Charlotte, Detroit, and Boston throughout the 1970s, white citizens of
Chattanooga still effectively resisted its implementation in several ways. First, they successfully
obtained a lower court ruling that prohibited taxation to obtain funding for buses in January
1972. Although this order was eventually reversed by Judge Wilson, it paralyzed any traction the
amended desegregation plan might have gained in the crucial years after its supposed
implementation. Next, white parents from the suburbs surrounding Chattanooga successfully
exempted themselves from the city desegregation plan when their county schools were annexed
into the Chattanooga Public School system in 1975. By annexing white-majority schools, the
school board supplemented their rapidly declining enrollment figures; however, these schools
were not officially included in the court-ordered plan and thus escaped any busing, zoning, or
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pairing burdens. Finally, the most prevalent way white Chattanooga parents avoided grappling
with the realities of desegregation was with massive white flight to private educational facilities.
This tactic resulted in an abrupt, sharp decline in enrollment statistics for the school system as a
whole and compromised public education in Chattanooga.83 In many ways, white citizens of
Chattanooga modeled their resistance after the highly-publicized white backlash in communities
such as Charlotte and Detroit. However, regional disparities also differentiated the story of
Chattanooga’s desegregation and rendered the response of its white community unique.
Comparison and contrast of white response in Chattanooga and these respective cities situates
Chattanooga within the larger narrative of post-1970 desegregation in America.
The events that took place in Charlotte, North Carolina throughout 1969 and 1971
illustrate the efficacy of suburban mobilization in impeding a civil rights pursuit of
comprehensive desegregation via busing and provide grounds for understanding methods of
white resistance in Chattanooga. As one of the first regional centers to employ a two-way busing
scheme, in which black children contained in low-income urban public housing were exchanged
with the children of white suburbanites, Charlotte commanded the attention of the nation
throughout the dramatic unfolding of its desegregation case. On April 23, 1969, two years prior
to Chattanooga’s own busing order, Judge James McMillan issued an unprecedented ruling in the
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg case, arguing that “freedom of choice” plans, such as the one in
effect in Chattanooga during this time, were inadequate at dismantling desegregation in a town
where an entire faction of the population was concentrated in one residential area, as the black
population was within the northwest quadrant of the inner city.84 Following his ruling, white,
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middle-class parents across Charlotte began to mobilize in a movement that, as Matthew Lassiter
argues, “charted a middle path between the caste framework of white supremacy and the
egalitarian agenda of redistributive liberalism.”85 These men and women—stay-at-home
mothers, low-level insurance executives, faithful church attendees—epitomized the qualities of
suburban, middle-class respectability, and thus organized, not in the streets, but across picket
fences, grocery aisles, and church pews. The Concerned Parents Association (CPA), a group of
parents from the fringe suburban region of Mecklenberg County, was the product of this
grassroots coalition and proved to be the driving force behind anti-busing resistance in Charlotte.
The platform of the CPA boasted, “a color-blind defense of middle-class respectability” and
“insisted that opposition to busing had nothing to do with racial prejudice.”86
Although the antibusing campaign of the CPA successfully captured local and national
attention throughout 1969 and 1970 and influenced legislators and public officials from the
ground up, a deep commitment to public education and legality eventually triumphed in
Charlotte, as the majority of white middle-class protestors laid their exactions aside when the day
for busing implementation arrived. In September of 1970, after over a year of protest, volunteers
from both the inner city and the suburbs united to oversee that the first few days of integration
ran smoothly and peacefully.87 During the first year that schools operated under McMillan’s
busing plan, “school attendance averaged more than 90 percent of projected enrollment, and
white flight proved to be minimal in the suburban schools, now fully integrated along the 70-30
districtwide ratio.”88 In the end, white Charlotte residents prided themselves on their “Charlotte
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Way,” or their commitment to nonviolence and racial moderation. For the most part, the
Charlotte busing crisis settled smoothly, even though suburban parents never recounted their
stance on two-way busing. Rather than acknowledge the realities of structural racism and the
necessity of deliberate policy designed to overcome housing segregation, white citizens of
Charlotte credited peace in schools to their own willingness to concede rights for the sake of
legal compliance.
Because Chattanooga and Charlotte shared a number of demographic and economic
similarities in the early 1970s, events in Charlotte had a direct bearing on the unfolding of
desegregation in Chattanooga, and white resistance to busing in Chattanooga was in many ways
modeled after the methods employed by the Concerned Parents Association. Similar to Charlotte,
Chattanooga was a Sunbelt mid-sized metropolis composed of a densely populated, mostly black
urban center and white suburban communities rippling outwards. Also like Charlotte,
Chattanooga’s school system had operated under a “freedom of choice” plan throughout the
1950s and 1960s, which, when combined with the pervasiveness of segregation in housing,
produced minimally integrated schools. Lawyers representing the school board, particularly
Raymond Witt, knew that the outcome of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg would have a strong
bearing on Judge Wilson’s rulings. In a December 1970 memorandum to fellow lawyer John
Hennis, Witt wrote, “Watch the Swann case. What happens over there will certainly swing the
pendulum one way or the other for us.89 While Judge Wilson’s ruling certainly aligned with the
basic premise of Judge McMillan’s, Chattanooga did not find itself bound to a specific busing
plan as Charlotte did. Therefore, white resistance to busing in Chattanooga in many ways faced
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fewer challenges than in Charlotte. White parents were not subject to the same level of intense
federal supervision, and they were often able to work out their frustrations with desegregation at
a local level, as can be seen in the lower-level court ruling that followed the 1971 Mapp v. Board
of Education of Chattanooga trial.
In the aftermath of Judge Wilson’s order, white parents of Chattanooga successfully
blocked desegregation efforts by relocating their private interests to a local circuit court and
obtaining a ruling that precluded the purchase of buses for the next two years. Two driving
forces impelled this judgement. Amongst the suburbs surrounding the Chattanooga urban center,
a coalition of white parents formed the Concerned Citizens of a Chattanooga—a name that
suggested strong identification with the objectives and methods of the well-known Concerned
Parents Association of Charlotte. Even more important was the East Lake-Boulevard Advisory
Council. At the time, some of the wealthiest and most influential members of Chattanooga
resided in East Lake, and it had long been known as an overwhelmingly white area of the city. In
late 1971 and early 1972, as the school board sought to procure funds for buses from the city
council, the East Lake-Boulevard Advisory Council fought equally hard to ensure this would not
happen, attacking the stance of any city commissioner who voted in favor of funding the
desegregation plan. As one member wrote, “We are, to say the least, shocked by the
announcement of August 30, 1971 of the appropriation of our city tax monies…to implement the
forced busing of our children out of their neighborhood schools.”90 The Concerned Citizens of
Chattanooga took their contention one step further, suing the city commission in the circuit court
of judge Joe Hunter, an avid advocate of the antibusing cause. In his January 1972 opinion,
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which forbade the city commission of Chattanooga from levying taxes to pay for buses, he
declared, “The busing concept violates the laws of reasoning and even sanity. It endangers and
jeopardizes the health and lives of hundreds of small children….It disrupts the neighborhood’s
whole concept of the American way of life and it depreciates quality education.”91 Like white
Charlotte parents and President Nixon, Hunter evinced the idea that desegregation defied logic.
Ultimately, Hunter’s ruling placed the city commission and the school board under two directly
conflicting court orders, and any progress made towards providing funding for the purchase of
school buses immediately halted. Although Judge Wilson overturned this lower order in August
of the same year, the confusion created was enough to also propel him to postpone full
implementation of the transportation plan until all appeals of the case had been exhausted or
January 1, 1974, “whichever came first.”92 In a narrative that differed starkly from Charlotte’s,
busing in Chattanooga was slowly being eliminated before it had even begun.
Another influential busing narrative that captured national attention during the 1970s, this
one outside of the “Sunbelt South,” occurred in the metropolitan area of Detroit and
demonstrated the power of forceful, sometimes-violent resistance to forced integration—a form
of activism that lay on the opposite end of the spectrum from that employed in Charlotte. In
1971, as the outcry against cross-town busing slowly dwindled in Charlotte, an entirely new legal
case opened in the northern metropolis of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs, particularly one
named Warren. Known for the quality of its six school districts and safe neighborhoods, Warren
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became a haven for white families who could afford to flee Detroit’s inner city as revitalization
efforts concentrated public housing units there.93 Prior to the desegregation of public schools
there, Warren had already achieved a negative reputation with the federal government due to a
1970 investigation of discriminatory housing practice. As can be imagined, a community of this
nature took great issue with the liberalization of Detroit’s school board administration that began
in the late 1950s, as the NAACP coalesced with white activists to reform the horrific conditions
of black schools in preparation for desegregation. However, their protests could not halt the tide
of integration, and in April of 1971, the lawsuit that would come to be known as Bradley v.
Milliken reached the courtroom of federal district judge Stephen Roth. In June 1972, after finding
the Detroit school system guilty of de jure segregation, Judge Roth approved a two-way busing
plan that would cover fifty-three school districts in southeastern Michigan and affect 780,000
students—the most comprehensive busing order ever handed down by a federal court.94
By summer of 1974, Detroit’s school desegregation case finally reached the Supreme
Court, where a 5 to 4 overturn of Roth’s two-way busing order set a new national precedent for
the elimination of massive two-way busing plans. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren
Burger wrote that because it could not be shown that Warren and other suburban towns were
guilty of de jure segregation, busing plans could not punish them through subjection to crosstown busing.95 With this rejection of Judge Roth’s metropolitan plan, they sent the responsibility
for finding a solution back to Detroit, where it fell into the hands of Judge Robert DeMascio.
DeMascio hurriedly put together a quick-fix package that would bus students within the city,
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rework the school system’s disciplinary policies, and institute a reading program to “make up for
the second-class educational experience that the school board had provided generations of black
students.96 The Supreme Court’s overhaul and DeMascio’s mild remedy to the serious problem
of segregation in Detroit reflected a changing of the judicial tide towards forced integration
through busing throughout the nation. Whereas the rule of law had upheld affirmative
responsibility on behalf of the school board to eliminate segregation in 1971 in Charlotte, by
1974, it took the opposite position. Residents of Warren and other southeastern Michigan
suburbs, despite the volatility and occasional violence of their protest movements, successfully
secured their safe suburban harbor, with its white-majority neighborhood schools. Because of
this, historian David Riddle argues, “any liberal consensus that might once have shaped public
opinion [crumbled]…Thus, Detroit became the most segregated metropolitan area in the
nation.”97
Although Chattanooga’s white resistance to busing was less publicized than that of
Detroit’s, the two industrial centers actually adopted similar desegregation and busing policies
by the mid-1970s, largely through the efforts of their white citizens. Whereas the white
community of Warren relied on openly hostile tactics, such as the burning of Roth in effigy, to
indicate their unwillingness to cope with busing, the white citizens of suburban Chattanooga
relied on a campaign to exempt certain majority-white suburban schools from any desegregation
plans imposed by federal court. These disparate methods produced the same outcome. Numerous
white children of Chattanooga and Detroit’s middle-class families were spared the burden of
busing, zoning, or pairing plans. While pro-segregationists accomplished this in Detroit through
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an official repeal of Judge Roth’s order in 1974, the fight of white Chattanooga parents did not
begin until a year afterwards. During the summer of 1975, seven schools previously operated by
the Hamilton County school system switched administrations and officially became part of the
Chattanooga Public School system, giving the school system an additional 5,085 students that it
desperately needed due to extensive white flight.98 In the previous school year, the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) launched an investigation into the Hamilton County
school system and found that over 2,000 white, or “non-minority” pupils residing within the city
of Chattanooga were attending county schools as a means of escape from desegregated city
schools.99 Although HEW condemned this as a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the annexation that took place the following year served only to solidify the opportunity
for white residents of Chattanooga to flee to the suburban school of their choice. According to
the zoning plans designed by the Chattanooga school board, the newly annexed schools would
serve the same populations they had served as county schools, creating a blatantly segregated
total of 5,648 white students and 23 black students.100 Unsurprisingly, James Mapp and Avon
Williams filed a motion in court requesting that they be subject to the more comprehensive city
desegregation plan, due to their overwhelmingly white student bodies.101 With a waning
commitment to desegregation similar to that of Justice Warren Burger in the Bradley v. Milliken
case, Judge Wilson denied Mapp’s request for further relief and approving the zones submitted
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by the school board, a decision that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld. Ultimately, these
annexations reaffirmed that many Chattanooga schools still relied on flagrant segregation to
retain their student population and demonstrated that the white community of Chattanooga could
effectively resist busing without highly visible or publicized defiance to the rule of law.
“End It All”: The Denouement of Desegregation in Chattanooga
In December 1986, District Judge Allan Edgar ruled that the court-approved
desegregation plan from 1971 had been fully implemented in Chattanooga’s public schools,
ending the longest running case in Chattanooga’s court history and releasing the school system
from federal supervision.102 In his opinion, Edgar wrote, “A school desegregation case need not
last forever. The role of this court has not come to an end. It is no longer appropriate for this
court to be involved in the operation of the Chattanooga city schools, a task now best left entirely
to publicly elected officials.”103 In the years following the dismissal of the twenty-six-year suit,
these “publicly elected officials” set about dismantling the few provisions of the desegregation
plan that remained in effect. In 1989, school board attorney Raymond Witt advised that the
Chattanooga school system “eliminate virtually all bus service,” stating any action would be
constitutionally permissible as long as it was “not adopted to produce a racially segregated
school system.”104 Chattanooga citizens celebrated the end of the case as well, publishing
editorials under titles such as “Edgar Shows Good Sense” and “Time to Call It Quits.”105 In
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“Time to Call It Quits,” an anonymous citizen wrote, “It’s high time the plaintiffs in this case
admit that it’s gone as far as it can go and abandon efforts to use the schools as battleground for
social change.”106 Newspaper articles such as these and the school board’s immediate efforts to
descale busing and transportation provisions ultimately contributed to the prevailing sentiment
that the end of desegregation constituted a positive change for the community.
Despite the celebratory atmosphere brought about by the conclusion of the Mapp v.
Board case, troubling statistics defined the Chattanooga school system throughout the final
quarter of the twentieth century. In 1986, when the federal court deemed schools compliant with
the desegregation plan, twenty-five out of the thirty-six elementary schools in the system were
“racially identifiable,” meaning that seventy percent or more of the student population was either
black or white. Of these schools, five still contained an all-black or all-white student body. This
trend held true for middle and high schools as well, with schools such as Howard High
maintaining an all-black student population.107 While enrollment statistics for the system as a
whole remained low, seventeen percent of children in Chattanooga and Hamilton County
attended one of the ten private school institutions in the city. This percentage stood well above
both the state average of seven percent and the national average of eleven percent—a testament
to the white exodus to private schools that occurred during the process of desegregation.108 These
issues continue to linger within the Chattanooga public school system today. According to
information compiled by UnifiEd, a nonprofit organization formed to supplement public

Folder 2, Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of
Tennessee at Chattanooga, Tennessee.
106
“Time to Call It Quits…”
107
Chattanooga Public Schools, “Racially Isolated and Racially Identifiable Schools by Student Enrollment: 1985,”
Box 19, Folder 5, Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records,
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Tennessee.
108
Janni Benson, “Private vs. Public: Education Rivalry Harmful, Some Say,” The Chattanooga Times, October 12,
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education in Chattanooga, a number of “racially identifiable” schools still exist within the
system.109
The present conditions of Chattanooga’s public schools ultimately reflect the legacy of
the twenty-six-year battle for desegregation fought in both hallways and courtrooms. From 1954,
when the Supreme Court issued the Brown v. Board mandate, until 1986, citizens and public
officials of Chattanooga struggled to define and implement desegregation within schools. During
the first phase of this process, roughly 1955 until 1970, the Chattanooga school board attempted
to appease both federal courts and the community with a “freedom of choice” plan that failed due
to residential segregation, protests within schools, and an evolving understanding of the deeper
issues which kept white and black children from attending the same schools. In 1971, these
factors resulted in a more comprehensive desegregation plan which included busing provisions
and required that the school board take affirmative action to dismantle lingering segregation in
schools. However, as in other communities such as Charlotte and Detroit, white resistance
effectively precluded this plan from producing integrated schools. By securing a lower court
order prohibiting funding for busing and exempting a number of annexed schools from
desegregation measures, the white community of Chattanooga, aided by the compliance of the
school board, ensured that many schools would remain segregated until the dismissal of the
Mapp v. Board case in 1986.

109

For current statistics on each school within the Chattanooga public school system, see Unifi-ed.org. For an
example of the lack of racial diversity in many public schools, compare Signal Mountain High and Brainerd High.
Signal Mountain High School currently maintains a 92.5% white student population, while Brainerd High School’s
student enrollment is 94.2% black.
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Appendix of Images
Image 1.1

“1971-1972 Senior High Attendance Zones,” The Chattanooga Times Free Press, August 12, 1971.

Image 1.2

“Tennessee Society to Maintain Segregation Correspondence with Raymond B. Witt, October 1955.”
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Image 1.3

“Kate H. Steele Correspondence with Raymond B. Witt, March 1, 1960.”

Image 1.4

“Disorderly Negroes Mar Brainerd Games,” The Chattanooga News-Free Press, October 4, 1969.
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Image 1.5

“The Black United Front,” May 2, 1970.

Image 1.6

“Brainerd High School Closed Today; Officials Confer on Opening, Trouble,” The Chattanooga News-Free Press,
April 16, 1970.
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